What ActivityWatch Pro can pay for
The November 9 model needed 13, 45, or 206 more subscribers to cover 10%, 25%, or 100% of a historical monthly operating gap. Those numbers make the limits of a small subscription line concrete.
ActivityWatch Pro had 10 active subscriptions and $123.33 in monthly recurring revenue at the November 19 snapshot. That’s real support for open-source software. It is also a long way from funding a company.
I wanted a more useful question than “is MRR growing?”: what could this revenue actually pay for, and what would have to change for it to pay for more?
The resulting model is deliberately small. It compares gross subscription MRR with a historical monthly operating gap. It does not forecast growth, estimate runway, or prove that Superuser Labs will break even this year.
A monthly hurdle, not a year-end rescue
The reference figures are Superuser Labs’ FY2025 operating costs of 459,090 SEK and net revenue of 104,144 SEK. The difference is 354,946 SEK per year, or about 29,579 SEK per month. At an assumed exchange rate of 10.5 SEK per US dollar, that is $2,817.03 per month.
These are the historical figures behind the gap discussed in my Q3 sustainability check-in. They are not a measured FY2026 operating run-rate. Costs and revenue can change; the exchange rate is an assumption, not a live quote.
There is another important distinction: reaching $2,817 in MRR on December 31 would not pay the preceding eleven months’ bills. An exit-month revenue rate and full-year operating break-even answer different questions. The table below measures the former against a historical benchmark, not the latter.
The original frontier: 13, 45, or 206 more subscribers
The calculation was made on November 10 using the November 9 observation: 9 active subscriptions, $118.33 MRR, or $13.15 per subscription on average. Current MRR is subtracted from each target before calculating the additions.
| Share of historical monthly gap | Target MRR | Additional subscriptions at observed blend | Additional Personal monthly subscriptions ($5) | Additional Business accounts at four seats ($80) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% | $281.70 | 13 | 33 | 3 |
| 25% | $704.26 | 45 | 118 | 8 |
| 100% | $2,817.03 | 206 | 540 | 34 |
Each column is a separate scenario. The Business column assumes every additional account buys four seats; it is not the price of a one-seat account. The observed blend assumes future subscriptions bring the same average MRR as the existing ones. It does not mean that thirteen arbitrary new subscribers would produce $171.
The formula is simply:
Additional subscriptions = round up ((target monthly revenue − existing MRR) ÷ assumed monthly revenue per added subscription).
Rounding uses the unrounded blend, not the displayed $13.15. That detail matters near an integer boundary.
The newer November 19 snapshot has 10 subscriptions and $123.33 MRR. Repeating the calculation at its lower $12.333 average MRR per subscription gives 13, 48, and 219 additional subscriptions. More subscribers and more revenue can coexist with a larger blended subscriber hurdle when the mix changes.
The original 13/45/206 figures describe a dated scenario. They are not today’s targets quietly carried forward.
The average is mostly one Business account
On November 9, one four-seat Business account contributed $80 of the $118.33 MRR, about 68%. The rest came from Personal subscriptions: six monthly at $5, plus two annual at $50 per year, recognized as $4.17 per month each.
One account supplied more than two-thirds of the recurring revenue. That makes the blend useful for describing the existing business and fragile for projecting the next hundred customers.
A four-seat Business account brings the same gross MRR as sixteen Personal monthly subscriptions. That makes clearer team-facing messaging worth testing. It does not establish that Business customers are easier to acquire: the sample is one account, and I have no measured Business conversion rate or acquisition cost to substitute for that missing evidence.
Personal support still matters. Nine people choosing to support a tool is not a failure because one company contributes more. But an acquisition plan needs to keep those two paths separate rather than smuggle a favorable customer mix into an average.
Gross MRR is not spendable margin
All three scenarios use gross subscription revenue. Personal pricing includes VAT where applicable; payment processing also takes a share. Support costs are not modeled. Once those costs are included, covering a given operating gap needs more subscriptions than the table suggests.
Annual payments are spread over twelve months for MRR. They do not arrive in cash every month. One-time support is excluded entirely from this recurring-revenue calculation. Adding it to MRR would make the chart prettier and the plan worse.
What I would do with this result
At the November 19 snapshot, AW Pro’s gross MRR equals about 4.4% of the historical monthly gap. It is a small recurring contribution, not evidence that subscriptions alone will carry this year’s finances.
I would keep the existing Personal support path available, test a clearer route for teams, and keep consulting and cost discipline in the financial plan. I would not move effort away from those larger levers on the strength of a single Business account. Nor would I invent a growth forecast from ten subscriptions.
The useful output of this model is a boundary: AW Pro can become a durable funding line without being assigned the job of rescuing the whole company immediately. A historical gap, a dated revenue snapshot, and explicit assumptions are enough to make that boundary visible.
If ActivityWatch is useful to you or your team, ActivityWatch Pro is a way to support its development. The software remains open source.